Vissa drar slutsatser av att dessa svartklädda rörde sig fritt i de rödas avspärrade områden och att deras ledare "seh daeng" uppträdde tillsammans med de andra röda ledarna på scen och gjorde uttalanden från de rödas scen.
Så svårt är det väl inte att dra slutsatser av detta. Inte var det kungens order de var där på kan jag nog upplysa om utan att få mothugg. Men att sedan ha tillgång till deras ID-handlingar och anställningsbevis har naturligtvis ingén här på MPR likväl som HRW.
Så här skriver HRW i sin rapport om Black shirts.
The “Black Shirts”
The UDD’s public deployment of hundreds of security guards dressed in uniforms resembling those of the paramilitary Thahan Phran implied a militaristic element to the protest movement. Indeed, many assumed that Red Shirt security guards were behind the armed violence against government forces.
However, Human Rights Watch’s investigations found that the attacks did not originate with Red Shirt Guards, but with a secretive armed element within the UDD whom protesters and media called the “Black Shirts” or “Men in Black”—though not all were dressed in black.54
Members of these armed groups were captured on photographs and film armed with various military weapons, including AK-47 and M16 assault rifles, as well as M79 grenade launchers, during their clashes with government security forces.
A journalist, who spent several days together with a group of armed militants at the Ratchaprasong protest camp, described to Human Rights Watch his experience with the Black Shirts:
The day I met up with the group, they were near Lumphini Park and the Rama IV [road] junction, living in a tent. I was not allowed to photograph them. I met about 17 or 18 of them, but they said they were part of a group of 30. They had more people helping them, helpers and their own medics. They were all ex-military, and some of them were still on active duty. Some of them were paratroopers, and at least one was from the Navy. They had AR-15s, TAR-21s, M16s, AK-47s [military assault rifles], but I didn’t see them with M79s [grenade launchers]. They told me that their job was to protect the Red Shirt protesters, but their real job was to terrorize the soldiers.
[T]hese guys were fearless. They operated mostly at night, but sometimes also during the day. They went out in small teams [to confront the army].
They didn’t use walkie-talkies, just mobile phones and runners [to deliver messages]. I saw no interaction with the Red Shirt leaders. But these guys were contacted by someone, someone recruited them to come, I have no idea who. Someone provided them with weapons. They rationed their bullets—when they went out they had 30 bullets [each].
They weren’t really “black” shirts—they were sometimes in green military uniforms and others dressed like Red Shirt protesters. They didn’t have any relationship with the Red Guards, and weren’t interested in dealing with the Red Shirt leaders. They took their work very seriously. The guys I met, they knew how to move and shoot. They also had experience handling explosives. The Black Shirts didn’t come to try and take territory—they shoot and then they leave, they hit [the soldiers] and retreat.
A Thai journalist stationed near Bon Kai junction said the Black Shirt militants he encountered during the May 17-19 clashes were well-armed, appeared to be trained in military tactics, and seemed to have a separate command line from the Red Shirt Guards:
From what I saw, the Black Shirt militants and the Red Shirt protesters were fighting alongside each other in the areas around Bon Kai junction. But they did not share the same command line. The Red Shirts seemed to be driven by anger as they saw soldiers moving in and opening fire at the protesters. They burned tires and used slingshots to shoot metal bolts, rocks, and fire crackers at soldiers. They also tried to use petrol bombs and homemade rockets, made of PVC [durable plastic] and metal pipes, to attack soldiers. But the aim of their rockets was not accurate enough to hit soldier bunkers and cause any serious damage. Some of the Red Shirts went out on foot and motorcycles to challenge soldiers to come out from their bunkers and fight openly. But they had to dash back behind the barricades when soldiers shot them with rubber bullets and live rounds. This cat-and-mouse game went on all day. I only saw two of the Red Shirts firing at soldiers with revolver pistols.
The Black Shirts, on the other hand, were well armed. They attacked soldiers with AK-47 and HK-33 assault rifles, and M79 grenade launchers. They were also very cautious when they moved around, using smoke as their cover. They appeared to benefit from the havoc created by the Red Shirts, which distracted soldiers as well. The Black Shirts did not stay in one spot for too long. They moved around, took their positions, opened fire, and then retreated. The way they operated reminded me of those with military training. Some of the Black Shirts used walkie-talkies, while others use mobile phones, to communicate with each other. Their operations seemed to be coordinated by a man who always had sunglasses on. At one point, I heard him giving orders to the Black Shirts to fire M79 grenades at the bunkers and sniper posts of soldiers. But when I asked the Black Shirts about that man, they told me I should not raise that question again if I want to stay behind their line. The Red Shirts that I talked to said they did not know who that man was either. Nevertheless, they believed that the Black Shirts were there to protect them and help them fight more effectively.57
57 Human Rights Watch interview with Thai journalist [name withheld], Bangkok, September 10, 2010.
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/thailand0511webwcover_0.pdf
Det ser väl ut som om HRW ganska kraftigt pekar ut Black shirts som en styrka på Thakisn sida som opererar tillsammans och i skydd av red shirts.
